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ABSTRACT 
A stylized  fact  in the growing  literature  on public  sector  labor mar- 
kets is  that estimates  of public  sector  union wage premia  are significantly 
lower  than estimates  of private sector  union wage  premia.  In this  paper I 
investigate  the hypothesis  that this difference  may in part be due to the 
differing  legal environments  in which public  and private  sector  unions  oper- 
ate.  Using  data from the Current Population  Survey  and the Census  of Popu- 
lation,  I  find that public  sector  union  wage differentials  increase  signifi- 
cantly  with  the degree  of legal protection  afforded  to  the union  in bargain- 
ing.  However,  the estimated  public  sector union  wage premia  when no legal 
controls  are included  in the specification  are close  to the estimated  premia 
under  the strongest  legal environment.  Consequently,  while  controlling  for 
the legal environment  in the public  Sector is important,  it may not recon— 
cUe  the differences  between  estimated  public  and private  sector  union  wage 
premia. 
Joseph  Tracy 
Department  of Economics 
Yale  University 
New  Haven,  CT  06520 One of the "stylized  facts"  which  has emerged  from the growing 
literature  on  public sector  labor markets  is that  estimates  of public  sector 
union  wage differentials  are significantly  lower  than estimates  of private 
sector  union wage differentials.  In a recent  survey,  Ehrenberg  and Schwarz 
(1986)  comment on this comparison. 
What is most striking  is how small  these  numbers  typically  are! 
The estimated  relative  wage differentials  associated  with union 
membership  or collective  bargaining  coverage  are typically  smaller 
than 10 percent  and rarely  exceed  20 percent.  These estimates  are 
considerably  lower  than  the estimates  obtained  from private  sector 
studies  and they  suggest  that the relative  wage effects  of unions have 
been  less in the public—sector  than the private—sector.  (p.  1228) 
A key Issue  Is whether  the differences  in the magnitudes  of union wage 
premium  across  sectors  are real or illusory. 
Several arguments  exist  as to why at least part of this observed 
difference  may be illusory.  Public  and private  sector  union wage differen- 
tials are  typically  derived  from different  wage equation  specifications 
estimated  on different  types of data.  The basic difference  In  the level of 
aggregation  of the data used  in public  and private  sector  studies has 
resulted  in important  differences  in the types  of control variables  included 
in these  studies.  Public  sector  wage equations  have focused on  economic, 
demographic,  and political  variables  relating  to the geographic  area 
containing  the bargaining  unit.  rn contrast,  private  sector  wage equations 
have  focused  on individual  worker  characteristics.  Several  other specifica- 
tion  differences  include the treatment  of the endogeneity  of the union 
status of  workers,  the treatment  of "threat" or "spillover"  effects,  and the 
treatment  of the occupational  structure  of the work force.1 
1Details  of these  arguments  as well  as specific  references  to  the empirical 
literature  can be found  in Ehrenberg  & Schwarz  (1986) and Freeman  (1986). —2— 
Assuming  that all of  the gap between private  and public sector  union 
wage differentials  can not be explained  by data  or specification 
differences,  a second  issue  is what factors explain  the inability  of public 
sector  unions  to generate  comparable  premiums  for their  workers.  A natural 
starting  point  is to examine the relative  bargaining  power  between public 
and private sector  unions.  Previous  studies have emphasized  the nonprofit 
nature of government  employers  and the likely effects  this aay have on  the 
bargaining  procesa.  A second  distinction  between public  and private sector 
bargaining  is the legal  environment which  governs  the bargaining  process. 
Private sector  bargaining  is governed  by  a largely  uniform  set of laws and 
court decisions.  The only source  of variation  is the ability  of a state  to 
pass a Right-to-Work  law.  In contrast,  public  sector bargaining  is governed 
by a set of laws which  can vary both  between  states  for a particular  group 
of workers and between  groups of  workers  within  a particular  state.  Pubiic 
sector  bargaining  laws range  from one extreme  of outright  prohibitions 
against  bargaining  to the other  extreme of a duty  of public  employers  to 
bargain which is backed  up with the right to strike or access  to arbitra- 
tion.  In the best situation,  public  sector unions  can negotiate  contracts 
in a legal environment  comparable  to the private  sector.  In  the worst 
situation,  public  sector  unions  can not negotiate  a contract  at all. 
The potential  importance  of investigating  the role of  variations  in 
public  sector  bargaining  laws in explaining  variations  in public  sector 
union wage premiums  was emphasized  by Ehrenberg  & Schwarz  (1986). 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  however,  there  are no studies  that have 
empirically  looked  at how the nature of impasse procedures  affects the 
union/nonunion  differential  .  . ,  the  smaller  estimated  differentials  in 
the public sector  @i  reflect  smaller  actual  differentials  caused by 
the different  nature of laws governing  bargaining  in that sector. 
(p.  1229) -3- 
In  this paper  I examine  the influence  of  the legal  environment  on  the 
union  differentials  which are negotiated  In the public  sector.  I  compare 
union wage differentials  for teachers  and po1ice  under  a variety  of 
different  bargaining  law configurations.  Particular  attention  Is paid to 
the issue of the potential  endogeneity  of  the bargaining  law variables.  The 
basic findings are that  public  sector  union wage premiums  Increase signifi- 
cantly with the degree of legal protection  afforded  to the union in 
bargaining.  However,  the estimated  union wage premia  when no legal controls 
are inc1uded  in the specification  are close to  the estimated  union wage 
premia  under  Duty—to-Bargain  laws.  Consequently,  while  controlling  for the 
legal environment  in the public sector  is important,  it may not reconcile 
differences  between  estimated  public  and private  union  wage differentials. 
SUMMARY  OF PREVIOUS  STUDIES  OF BARGAINING  LAWS 
Considerable  attention  has been  focused on assessing  the impact  of 
Right-to-work  laws on unionization  rates in the private  sector.  Far less 
effort  has been  directed  toward  measuring  the impact  of Right-to—work  laws 
on the union wage  differential  in  the private  sector.  Two econometric 
concerns  show up in each of these  lines of  research.  The first  concern  is 
that there  exists unobserved  heterogeneity  In states which is correlated 
both  with  the presence  of a Right-to—Work  law and with the  level of  unioni— 
zation.  For example,  states  with strong  anti union  "sentiments'  may be 
likely  to have both  a Right—to—Work  law as well as lower unionization  rates. 
This creates a left-out—variables  bias in the coefficient  estimate  of the 
Right-to--Work law.  The second  concern  is that a simultaneity  bias exists. 
That is, the level of unionization  in a state may affect  the probability 
that a Right—to—Work  law is passed.  States with  high levels of unionization —4— 
may be less likely to pass such a law due to lobbying  efforts by the unions. 
A variety  of methods have been used in previous  studies to address one 
or both  of these  concerns.  Luasden & Petersen (1975) anelyze state  aggre- 
gate unionizatinn  rates  for the years  1939,  1953, and 1968.  The coefficient 
on the Right—to-Work  indicator  in the regression  using  the 1968 data  was 
negative  and significant.  Lumsden  & Petersen  test for left—out--variable 
bias by including  the same Right—to—Work  indicator  variable  in a regression 
using the 1939 data.  At this point  in time no states  had Right—to—Work 
laws.  The coefficient  estimate  was negative,  significant,  and of roughly 
the same order of magnitude  as the coefficient  estimate  from the 1968 
regression.  They conclude  that there  is no significant  effect  of the law 
per se on the level  of  unionization.  The negative  effect measured  using 
the 1968  data simply  reflected  lower prelaw  levels of unionization  due to 
other  unobserved  factors prevailing  in those states. 
Moore  & Newman (1975) analyze state  aggregate  unionization  rates  for 
the years  1950.  1960,  and 1970.  They address  the issue of simultaneity  by 
estimating  the unionization  equation  using  Two Stage  Least Squares.  They 
fit a model  for the process governing  the probability  that a Right-to-Work 
law is passed  in  a state.  This model  is used  to generate  predicted  proba- 
bilities  which  are used in place  of the Right—to—Work  Indicator  variable. 
They find a negative  and significant  coefficient  for the Right—to-Work 
indicator  but a negative  and insignificant  coefficient  for the predicted 
value of the indicator.  They  conclude  like  Lumsden  & Petersen  that there  is 
no effect  of  the  law per se on unionization  rates. 
Finally,  Ellwood  & Fine (1983) address  the problem  by examining  flows 
of unionization  generated  by NLRB  elections.  They argue  that flows will be 
more sensitive  than  stocks  to changes  in  the  legal environment  making  it —5- 
easier  to measure  the effect  of the law using  flow  data.  The data indicate 
that the flows  into unionization  drop immediately  following  the passage  of a 
Right—to—work  law and continue  to be below  the prelaw  levels  for up to ten 
years.  Their  estimates  imply a long  run reduction  of 5-10%  in the stock  of 
union  members  or equivalently  a drop of 1-3% in the unionization  rate.  For 
a sample of seven  states  they have  flow data both prior  to and following 
adoption  of a Right—to—work  law.  They estimate  a fixed  effect model  on data 
from these states  to test  for left—out—variable  bias.  Their  fixed  effect 
estimates  were virtually  identical  to their earlier  results.  Finally,  they 
test for simultaneity  by including  in  the specification  an indicator  that 
takes  a value  of one for the five years  prior  to the year the state  passed 
its Right-to-Work  law.  The simultaneity  argument would  predict  a negative 
coefficient  on this variable.  They find  a positive  and insignificant 
coefficient.  They  conclude  that the legal environment  does have an 
independent  effect on  the level  of private  sector  unionization  in a state. 
The effect  of Right-to—Work  laws on  private  sector  union wage 
differentials  has received  less attention  in  the literature.  Moore (1980) 
examines  a single  cross  section of workers  in 1970 drawn  from  the Income 
Dynamics  Panel  data.  He finds negative  and  insignificant  point  estimates  on 
the Right-to-Work  variable  in both  the nonunion  and union wage equations. 
The implied  effect  of the law on the union wage differential  is positive  but 
insignificant.  Farber  (1984) reexamines  this issue using  data  drawn  from 
the May 1977 Current Population  Survey  (CPS).  He finds negative  and signi- 
ficant  point  estimates  on the Right—to—Work  variable  in both the nonunion 
and union  wage equations.  The implied effect  of  the law on  the union wage 
differential  Is positive  and significant.  Mo clear  picture emerges  as to 
the magnitude  of the effect  of the legal  environment  on private  sector  union -6— 
wage differentials.  In addition,  neither  study  explicitly  tests  for the 
omitted  variable  bias or simultaneity  bias. 
Studies of the effects of the legal environment  on unionization  rates 
and wages  in the public  sector  are of more  recent  vintage.  This reflects 
the fact that until recently  no comprehensive  data set en public  sector 
bargaining  laws existed.  lchniowski  (1986) examines  the effect  of 
bargaining  laws on municipal  police  unionization.  Hazard models  are esti- 
mated for the duration  until  formation  of a police  bargaining  unit  in a 
city.  He finds  that unionization  rarely  proceeds  passage of a favorable 
bargaining  law.  In addition,  the bargaining  laws are the most important 
determinants  of the conditional  probability  of unionization.  Passage  of a 
Duty—to—Bargain  law significantly  increases  the likelihood  of the formation 
of a bargaining  unit.  Access  to arbitration,  though,  does not significantly 
affect  unionization. 
Freeman  & Valletta (1987)  investigate  the effect  of the legal 
environment  on unionization,  employment,  and wages.  Union  coverage  and 
employment  data  are obtained  from the Annual  Survey of  Government.  Wage 
data are obtained  from the 1984 May CPS.  The  legal environment  is proxied 
by a single  index  summarizing  the bargaining  laws  in effect.  This is in 
contrast  to other  studies which  have  tried  to estimate  separate  effects  for 
different  types  of bargaining  laws.  They find that more  "prounion"  legal 
environments  mre associated  with significantly  higher  union  coverage  rates, 
with significmntly  higher employment  levels  for covered  groups of  workers, 
and with significantly  higher union  wages.  They do  not test to see if the 
legal  environment  significantly  affects  union wage  premiums.  No specifica- 
tion tests are carried  out to check for possible  endogeneity  of their  legal 
index. —7- 
Indirect  evidence  on the effect of bargaining  laws on public  sector 
union wage premiums  Is given  In Zax  (1985),  In  this  study,  Zax examines  the 
effect of  different  "modes" of unionization  on the resulting  union  wage 
premium.  The modes  vary from one extreme of an unrecognized  union in a city 
with no recognized  bargaining  Units  to the other  extreme of a recognized 
bargaining  unit.  He finds that  going  from  the weakest  to  the strongest  mode 
of  unionization,  the measured  union  wage premiums  increase  from 3.8% to 
11.8%.  While  controlling  for the mode of unionization  is not equivalent  to 
controlling  for the prevailing  bargaining  laws,  the findings by Ichniowski 
(1986)  would  suggest  that they  are strongly  correlated. 
ECONOMETRIC  SPECIFICATION  ISSUES 
The impression  one  is left with after  reviewing  the  literature  on 
bargaining  laws is that no consistent  set of results  exists.  Results  vary 
with the type of data  used and the type  of specification  estimated.  No 
evidence  has been found  in support of the simultaneity  hypothesis  while 
mixed  evidence  has been found in  support  of  the omitted  variable  hypothesis. 
In  light of these  studies,  it remains  plausible  that the legal environment 
is an important  factor in explaining  the differences  in  union wage differen- 
tials  between  the public  and private  sector.  While an explicit  treatment  of 
omitted  variable  bias is warranted,  there  is less justification  for concern 
about  simultaneity.2 
follows  for two reasons.  First,  the connection  between  unionization 
rates and passage  of bargaining  laws seems more  plausible  than  a similar 
connection  for union  wage  differentials.  Unionization  rates directly 
translate  into electoral  pressure.  Second,  as already  pointed out,  there 
is no strong  evidence  to date supporting  the direction  of causality  from 
unionization  rates  to bargaining  laws. —8— 
Each  0f the techniques  used  in  previnus  studies  to correct for omitted 
variable  bias has been criticized.  The first method  is to estimate  a fixed 
effect  model using panel  data.  Two problems  arise  here.  This  method  can 
not be used  on a single  cross  section of data, and the method  assumes  that 
the omitted variables  are constant  through  tiae.  The  second method is to 
explicitly  model  the legislative  process which  determines  the legal environ- 
ment and then  to estimate  the outcome  (i.e. unionization  or wage)  equation 
using  Two Stage Least  Squares.  The fundamental  problem with this method  is 
the  lack of a convincing  model  of the legislative  process.3  This  leads to 
questionable  identification  of the model  through  functional  fora or 
arbitrary  exclusion  restrictions. 
Most estimates  of private  sector  union wage differentials  have  been 
based  on cross section  data  such as  the CPS.  Comparisons  with these 
previous  private sector  estimates  would  be facilitated  by using  similar  data 
sources.  This raises  the problem  of how to deal with omitted variable  bias 
issues  using  cross section  data.  In this paper  I  examine  three  approaches 
to this problem.  The first approach  is  to use the group  structura  (ie by 
city)  which  exists  in the data.  I assume  that the wage for  individual  i  in 
city  j  is determined  by the following  stochastic  model. 
(1)  ln  W.  .  =  X.  ,  fi  + Z.&  u. 
1,)  11  1  '.1 
'1  1  '1 
2  2 
Where  a,  —  N  (0,  o  )  and e.  .  -  N(0,  a 
I  a  1J 
The vector  contains  individual  worker  characteristics  while the vector 
Z  contains  variables  which  are constant  for all public  workers in  the city. 
3Severai  different  models  have  been  estimated.  See for example  Faber  & 
Martin (1979), Farber (1986), and Kochan (1973). -9— 
The composite  error  term for an  individual  consists  of a city specific and 
an individual  specific  error  component.  I  assume  that the a's and 's are 
uncorrelated  with each other  and that the 's are uncorrelated  with the 
included variables. 
The city specific  error  component  captures  the combined  effect  of the 
unobserved  state  and city  heterogeneity  (le omitted  variables  in Z)  on 
wages.  If  > 0 and the a's are uncorrelated  with  X and Z,  then OLS will 
produce  consistent  coefficient  estimates  but biased  standard  error 
estimates.  Moulton  (1986) demonstrates  that the magnitude  of this standard 
error  bias  is likely  to be largest  for the Z variables  since they  have no 
within  group  variance.  Since  the vector  Z  includes  the bargaining  law 
variables,  this can lead  to incorrect  inferences  as to the significance  of 
the legal environment.  This  problem  can be corrected  either by  recalculat- 
ing the OLS  standard  errors  using  estimates  of  and  or by  estimating  a 
random  effects  model. 
A more  important  problem  exists  If the a's are correlated  with 
variables  in X and/or  Z.  Previous  studies of bargaining  laws have argued 
that factors such as public  sentiment  toward  unions  will  affect both the 
type of bargaining  laws  in the state  as well as union and/or  nonunion wages. 
If this sentiment  is picked  up In the a's, then both IlLS  and random effects 
will be produce  biased  estimates  of the bargaining  law coefficients. 
The advantage  of the wage  specification  given  In  (1)  is that the 
hypothesis  that  the a's are correlated  with the included variables  can be 
investigated  using  a Rausman  test.  The basic idea behind  the test is that 
the "within  or "fixed  effect"  estimates  of $ are consistent  regardless  of 
the correlation  between  the a's and the included  variables,  while  the GLS 
are consistent  only under  the null that no correlation  exists.  The test —10— 
consists  of  -determining if there  is a statistically  significant  difference 
between  the Within  and the  IlLS  estimates  of fi. 
If the specification  test indicates  that the a's are correlated  with 
the included variables,  then it may still be possible  to obtain  consistent 
coefficient  estimates  by following  the Instrumental  Variable  Random  Effects 
procedure  (IVOLS) outlined  in Hausman  & Taylor  (1981).  Assume that the X's 
are exogenous  and that the source of  the correlation  with the a's is the set 
of bargaining  law variables  contained  in  Z.  In this case,  $ can be estima- 
ted using  the within  variation  in the X's while  the between  variation  in the 
X's can serve as instruments  for the Z's.  A second  Hausman  test can be 
carried  out to check  the validity  of this assumption.4 
The second approach  to the left—out-variable  problem  is to augment 
specification  (1) with proxies  for the likely  omitted  variables.  As 
mentioned  earlier,  states with  greater  tastes  for unionism  may be more 
likely  to pass permissive  public  sector  bargaining  laws.  In this case,  the 
coefficient  on the bargaining  laws  measures  both the direct  effect of the 
legal environment  as well as the indirect effect  of the prevailing  union 
sentiment  in  the state.  The second  test of this hypothesis  is to add the 
level of private sector  unionism  to  the public sector  wage equations.  If 
private  sector union  coverage  in the state  is a good proxy  for the prevail- 
ing union  sentiment,  then controlling  for private  union coverage  should 
reduce  the degree  of bias  in the bargaining  law coefficients.  If there  is 
little  change In these coefficients,  then this  is further evidence  against 
the  left-out—variable  hypothesis. 
4Other  Instrumental  Variable  procedures  have  recently  been discussed  in  the 
literature.  See Amemiya  & MaCurdy  (1986); and Breusch,  Mizon  and Schmidt 
(1987). —11— 
The third approach  to the problem  is to include  the public  sector 
bargaining  laws  in a private  sector  wage specification.°  Since public 
sector  laws are not germane  to private  sector  bargaining,  they should  not 
have any direct effect  on  the estimated  union  wage differentials.  Any 
effect  of the public  sector  law variables  should  be attributed  to the 
indirect effect of the prevailing  sentiment  toward unionism.  If  these vari- 
ables  have the same qualitative  effect on  private  union wage differentials 
as they do on public  union  wage differentials,  then this is evidence 
supportive  of the left—out—variable  hypothesis.6 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
1 necessary  ingredient  for this type of study  is a comprehensive  data 
set of public sector  bargaining  laws.  The compilation  of this data was 
undertaken  by the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  and is discussed  in 
detail  in Valletta  & Freeman  (1985).  For this study,  the wealth of legal 
information provided  in  the data  have been collapsed  into a few key varia- 
bles.  The collective  bargaining  rights  of the union  have been summarized  in 
three basic  categories.  The left—out  category  consists  of states  that 
either  have no laws dealing  explicitly  with bargaining  rights  or that have 
laws which provide only 'weak  bargaining  rights.7  The second  category 
°I would  like to thank  Henry  Farber  for this suggestion. 
61n an earlier paper  I  focused on the issue of  selection  bias instead of 
omitted  variable  bias.  I  estimated  a multinomial  logit  selection  model 
where  workers  selected  into  one of four labor markets:  private/nonunion, 
private/union,  public/nonunion.  and public/union.  I  assumed  that all 
bargaining  laws, public  and private,  affected  a worker's  choice of sector 
but that  wages  were affected  only  by the bargaining  laws applicable  to that 
sector.  This led to exclusion  restrictions  between  the choice  and the 
outcome  equations.  None of the selection  effects  were significantly  diffe- 
rent from zero.  The public/union  selection  effect  was large  in  magnitude 
but imprecisely  measured.  In Light of these  findings,  it seems more fruit— 
ful to investigate  sources of biases  other  than selection  effects. 
'Weak bargaining  rights  include  situations  where  the public  employer  is —12— 
consists  of states which  have taken strong  positions  against  public  sector 
unions  by prohibiting  collective  bargaining.  At the other  extreme,  the 
third  category  consists  of states  which have imposed  a "Duty-to—Bargain"  on 
their  public  employers.  In addition  to the bargaining  rights  variables,  two 
variables  have  been constructed  which indicate  if the union has  the right  to 
strike or access  to arbitration  if bargaining  results  in an impasse. 
Finally,  similar  to the private sector, public  sector  union security  is 
summarized  by a Right-to-work  indicator variable. 
The bargaining  data is coded  separately  for state,  police,  fire, 
teachers,  and other local employees.  Table 1  givea  the overall  distribution 
of the bargaining  rights  variables  ss well as the distribution  by  region. 
The unit of observation  in Tables  1  through  3 is a function  unit  in a 
particular  state,  ie police  in Illinois,  teachers  is New Jersey,  etc.8  As 
of 1976 only  around  7% of the function  units  were prohibited  from collective 
bargaining.  Distinct  regional patterns  to the bargaining  rights  exist,  All 
function  units  in the Northeast  have Duty—to—Bargain  rights.  In contrast, 
only 19% of function  units  in the South had Duty—to-Bargain  rights, and none 
had the additional  right  to strike  or arbitration,  In addition  nearly  all 
prohibitions  against  collective  bargaining  were found  in the sooth. 
The distribution  of public  sector  Right—to—Work  laws  in aggregate  and 
by region  is given  in  Table  2.  Slightly  over 31% of the function  units were 
covered by these  laws.  A similar  regional  pattern  exits  for Right—to-Work 
laws as for bargaining  rights  laws.  No function  units  in the Northeast  are 
covered by Right-to-Work  laws while  over  43% of the function  units  in  the 
authorized  but not obligated  to negotiate  with the onion,  situations  where 
the onion  has the right  to  present  proposals,  and situations  where  the 
union has the right  to "meet and confer" with the employer. 
8Doty—to—bargain  laws have been  classified  as "strong"  if strike  or 
arbitration  rights  are also provided  and "weak"  if they  are not provided. -13— 
South are covered.  However,  despite  this similarity,  it is  not the case 
that Right—to-Work  laws are necessarily  synonymous  with anti—public  sector 
unionism.  To see this, the distribution  of public  sector  Right—to—Work  laws 
by type of bargaining  rights  is presented  in Table  3.  The same percentage 
of function  units  covered  by Right—to-Work  laws have strong  Duty—to—Bargain 
rights as prohibitions  against  collective  bargaining. 
Unfortunately,  there  are serious  limitations  associated  with  the major 
sources  of cross  section  data  on public  sector workers  which can be matched 
with  the bargaining  law data.  The  two sources used in this analysis  are the 
May CPS data  and the 1980 Census  of Population  (CoP)  data.  Data  on onion 
and nonunion  workers  is available  each year from the May CPS;  however, 
several  restrictions  must be met before  this data can be analyzed  for any 
given year.  Since  the bargaining  law data is gathered  at the state  level, 
we must be able to identify  the state  associated  with a public  employee's 
place  of work in order  to  merge  in the appropriate  set of laws.9  For 
reasons  of confidentiality,  the CPS grouped some states  together  up  until 
the 1977 survey;  a worker's  specific state  within  the group  can only be 
identified  if the worker  resides  in an identified  SMSA.  To utilize the full 
range  of variation  in public  sector  bargaining  laws, we must restrict 
ourselves  to analyzing  data from 1977 onwards.  The second  restriction  is 
that we must have  wage data for the worker.  Starting  in 1979 the CPS asked 
wage questioos  only  for the two outgoing  rotation  groups.  As a result  the 
effective  sample size  drops  drastically,  making  it  impossible  to estimate 
separate  wage equations  for union  and nonunion  samples  of public  employees. 
9The appropriate  bargaining  laws is a function of a worker's  place  of work 
and not necessarily  his/her  place of residence.  Unfortunately  the CPS only 
asks a place  of residence  question.  This  will result  in some mismatching 
of bargaining  laws with workers. -14- 
Consequently,  only the 1977 snd 1978 data  can he analyzed  as separate  cross 
sections  without  resorting  to pooling across  years.  This study will analyze 
the 1977 CPS data. 
The advantage  of  the CPS data Is  that it identifies  the union  status of 
each  public  sector  worker.  The disadvantage  of the CPS  is  that  it contains 
small  samples of workers  from each type of local  function  unit.  The problem 
of small sample  sizes  can be overcome  by using  the 1980 CoP data.  Combining 
the A and 8 samples  gives a combined  6% random  sample of the population. 
Each local  public  sector employee  was selected  from the 1980 CoP as well as 
a 1  in 100 subsample  of private sector  workers.  The principal  disadvantage 
of the CoP data  is that no union  question  is asked.  This problem can be 
addressed  hy restricting  the sample  to public  employees  working  in central 
cilies.  information  on  unionization  rates  for central  city public  employees 
is available  in the 1979 Census  of Government  (CoG) data.  For each  city, 
the CoG data  gives  both  the total  number of  employees  and the number of 
organized  employees  in each  function  unit.  This data  was used to construct 
a city/function  unit specific  union coverage  rate.  As will he discussed  in 
the next section,  separate  union  and nonunion  wage equations  can not be 
estimated  using  the CoP data.  instead, a single wage equation  with  the 
union  coverage  rate  as well as the coverage  rate interacted  with the 
bargaining  law variables  will be estimated. 
The following  selection  criteria will be used in creating  each sample 
used in the estimation.  Workers  must be employed  full time  or part time  for 
economic  reasons  in  a nonagricultural  job.  All observations  with 
"allocated"  or missing  responses  for variables  used  in the analysis  are 
deleted.  For the CPS data,  the definition  of labor  union  used is membership 
in a union  or employee  association.  For reasons  to be discussed  below,  the —15- 
analysis will be limited  to teachers  and police.  Summary  statistics  are 
given  In Table 4. 
EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
Three  groups  of local public  workers  were  selected  for potential  use  in 
this study:  teachers,  police, and fire fighters.  These three groups  were 
focused  on for two reasons-  First, each  group  can be identified  in both the 
OPS and the CoP data.  Second,  a close  link exists  for these  groups  between 
the collective  bargaining  and the employment  files of the SoG data.  This 
improves  the reliability  of the unionization  imputations  to be used  with the 
CoP data.10  Tests were carried  out to see if it would  be  permissible  to 
aggregate  some or all of these  three groups.  In no case did the data 
indicate  that aggregation  was justified.  The sample of fire fighters  from 
the CPS data  was  too small  to warrant  an independent  investigation.  As a 
consequence,  further analysis  was restricted  to  the samples  of teachers  and 
police.  In addition,  the CPS sample  sizes for the teachers  and police were 
too small  to estimate  a random  effects model.  Specification  tests  for group 
error  structures  were carried  out only for the CoP samples. 
10The  employment  file  of the SoG data gives both the total number  of  full-- 
time  workers  as well as the number  of organized  workers  in the function 
unit.  The collective  bargaining  file gives the number  of workers  in the 
bargaining  unit.  Both the percent  organized  as well  as the percent  in the 
bargaining  unit  were calculated.  If the percent  organized  was  positive, 
then the unionization  rate was set equal  to the percent organized.  If the 
percent  organized  was  zero and the percent in the bargaining  unit was 
positive,  then the unionization  rate was set equal  to the percent  in the 
bargaining  unit.  For some groups  of  workers  such  as clerical  workers,  the 
bargaining  unit can contain  workers  from several  function units  In the 
employment  file.  In these  cases,  the percent  io  the bargaining  unit can 
not be accurately  calculated. —16— 
A one—sided  CM test was calculated  to test the hypothesis  H0: a 
= 0 vs 
the alternative  H1: a  > 0.  The test statistic  is defined as follows. 
Z (  N.  (2 — z  z  ( u. 
.1  3 3  3  1  13 
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Where  u,. = OLS  residual  for worker  i in city (i.e. group)  j 
N = Total  sample  size 
th 
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The  CM  statistic  is distributed  as a standard  normal  variate.  The values of 
the CM statistic  for the teacher  and police  CoP samples were  9.61  and 9.50 
respectively.  Clear  evidence  of a group  error  structure  is indicated.  Both 
OLS and CLS estimates  are reported  in Tables  5 and 6 for the Cop samples. 
The variance  of the city—specific  error  component  is saall  relative  to the 
variance  of the  individual  specific  error  component.  Similar  to the find- 
ings  in Moulton (1986), the most significant  difference  between  OLS and CLS 
is the precision  of the coefficient  estimates  for the variables  with  no 
within  group  variance.  Allowing  for omitted  state  and/or city  variables 
through  inclusion  of a city specific error  component  can make an important 
difference  in the inferences  drawn  from the data. 
The last specification  issue  to investigate  is the possible  correlation 
between  the city  error  component  and the independent  variables.  The test of 
whether  a common  set of omitted variables  Influences  both  wages  and —17— 
bargaining  laws is a test of this correlation.  The }lausman  Chi Square 
statistics  (and the probability  under  the null hypothesis  of observing  a 
statistic  at least  this large)  for the teacher  and police  CoP samples  are 
X.  7.23 (0.78) and .  =  14.77  (0.10) respectively.11  The evidence  of 
correlation  is not strong  enough  in either  case to  warrant  using  instru— 
mental  random  effects.  This finding  is consistent  with  the Ellwood  & Fine 
(1983) results  for unionization  rates.  The two alternative  methods  for 
addressing  the Issue of left—out—variable  bias in the bargaining  law coeffi- 
cients  yield  similar findings  and will be discussed  below. 
While  no formal  model of public  sector wage determination  has been 
presented,  we can speculate  on the likely wage  effects  of each type  of 
public  sector bargaining  law,  The legal environment  may affect  public 
nonunion  wages  through  their influence  of union "threat" effects.  If threat 
effects  exist,  then a prohibition  against  collective  bargaining  eliminates 
the threat  of unionization  and consequently  shou1d  lower nonunion  wages.  On 
the other hand,  Duty-to—Bargain  laws make the threat of unionization  more 
credible  and consequently  should  lead  to higher nonunion  wages.  A similar 
pattern  of coefficients  would  be predicted  for the union  sector  through  the 
influence  of the legal environment  on the relative  bargaining  power  of 
unions.  The likely  coefficients  associated  with access to strikes or arbi- 
tration  is less clear.  These  added  provisions  do give  unions  recourse  if 
negotiations  with the employer  are not progressing.  In this sense  one might 
predict  a positive  wage effect.  However,  once  negotiations  have led to a 
strike or to arbitration.  it is not clear  that the union  should  be 
UThe test only indicates  whether  this correlation  exists  or not.  It does 
not  indicate  the source of  the correlation.  The investigator  must 
Identify  the endogeneous  variables  and instrument  them.  A followup 
Hausman  test will  indicate  if the correlation  still  exists  or not. -18-- 
systematically  better  off. 
The regression  results  for the CPS and CoP samples of teachers  and 
police  are given  in  Tables  5 and 6.  A summary of the effect  of the legal 
environment  on public  sector  union  wage differentials  is presented  in 
Table 7.  Examination  of the coefficients  for the ooolegal  variables  will  he 
left to the reader.  When no bargaining  law variables  are included  in the 
specifications,  the estimated  union  wage differentials  range  from 7-11%  for 
teachers  and 9-20%  for police.  With the exception  of the CPS teacher 
sample,  these  estimates  are close  to  the estimates  which  assume  that a Duty— 
to—Bargain  law  (with no access to strikes or arbitration)  is in effect. 
This soggests  that the failure to control  for the legal environment  is not 
the principal  explanation  of why public  onion wage differentials  are below 
private  sector  estimates. 
The similarity  between  these  two sets of onion  wage  differential 
estimates,  however,  masks  the important  role that  the legal environment 
plays  in determining  wage outcomes.  Prohibitions  against  collective 
bargaining  generally  result  in union wage premiums which  are  insignificantly 
different  from zero.  The exceptions  to this result  are the sizeable 
positive  differentials  produced  by the separate  onion  and nonunion  wage 
equations.  Public sector  onion wage differentials  are positive  in states 
with Meet—and—Confer  laws  (or no specific  laws) and statistically  signifi- 
cant for the CPS teacher sample  and the CoP police  sample.  In almost every 
case,  the union  wage differential  increases  when  Meet—and—Confer  laws are 
strengthened  to Duty—to—Bargain  laws.  The one exception  is  the police 
differential  calculated  using the separate onion  and nonunion  wage coeffi- 
cients.  The magnitude  of the  increase  in the onion premium  varies  both hy 
type  of worker  and sample.  For teachers,  the union  premiom  increases  from -19— 
13.9%  to 20.3%  in the CPS sample  and from  2.5% to 9.6%  in the CoP sample. 
For police,  the union  premium  increases  from 11.8%  to 12.4%  in the CPS 
sample and from 12.8% to 217% in the CoP sample.  Expanding  the legal 
rights  of pubiic  sector  unions  from simple  Meet-and--Confer laws  to Duty-to-- 
Bargain  laws  is associated  with a 6-8% higher  union wage differential.  The 
one exception  is the modest 0.4% increase  in the premium  for the CPS sample 
of police. 
While  the separate  nonunion  and union  samples from  the CPS are small 
and may produce  unreliable  estimates,  it  is still  interesting to look at the 
differential  effects  of the legal  variables  by union status of  workers. 
Results  differ by type of  worker.  For teachers,  there  does not appear  to 
be any evidence  that bargaining  laws add or detract  from union  threat 
effects.  For nonunion  teachers,  prohibitions  against  collective  bargaining 
do not significantly  lower wages  (by eliminating  the threat  effect( and 
Duty-to—Bargain  obligations  do not significantly  raise wages  (by strength- 
ening  the threat  effect(.  Instead,  the bargaining  laws affect  union  wsge 
differentiais  through their  influence  on  union  wages.  In contrast,  for 
police  there  is more evidence  of a threat  effect.  Since  no police 
hargaining  units  existed  in states  which  prohibited  collective  bargaining, 
no union  coefficient  could  be estimated  for  this variable.  There  is no 
evidence  that prohibiting  collective  bargaining  significantly  reduces  non- 
union police  wmges.  However,  nonunion  police in states  with Duty—to—Bargain 
laws receive significantly  higher  wages  than other nonunion  police.  This 
later finding  is consistent  with a union  threat  effect. 
The final aspects  of the legal environment  to examine are the access by 
the union  to strikes  or arbitration  and limitations  placed  on union  security 
clauses  in states  with right-to-work  laws.  The evidence  on the effect  of a -20— 
strike  threat on wage  outcomes  is liaited to the CPS sample  of teachers. 
Although  the CoP sample of teachers  is considerable  larger, no teachers  from 
this  saaple worked  in  states with right—to--strike provisions.  The evidence 
indicates  that  teacher onion  premia  are significantly  lower  in states  which 
allow  teachers  to strike.  Disaggregating  by nonunion  and onion  indicstes 
that the strongest  effect  is wages  of unionized  teachers.  Similarly,  the 
data indicate  that union wage presia  in  general  are lower  in states  which 
allow  access to arbitration.  This effect  is significant,  though, only for 
the CPS sample  of  teachers.  Finally,  in contrast  to Farber's  (1984)  finding 
that private sector  union  wage  differentials  are higher  in states with 
Right-to—Work  laws,  the data indicate  that public  sector  union wage differ- 
entials  are generally  lower  in states with Right—to—Work  laws.  This  effect 
is significant  only  for the CPS saaple of  teachers. 
Recall  that the Hausman  specification  test for correlation  between  the 
city—specific  error component  and the included variables  was the first of 
three  types  of tests  for left—out-variable  bias.  No strong  evidence  of 
correlation  was indicated  by the data.  The second  test  is to include  the 
level of private  sector unionization  in  the state  as a proxy  for the 
prevailing  attitude  in the state  toward  unionism.  If the bargaining  laws 
are primarily  proxies for these  underlying  attitudes  and if  private  sector 
union  coverage  is strongly  correlated  with  these  attitudes,  then controlling 
for private  union coverage  should  significantly  diminish  the explanatory 
power  of the bargaining  law variables.  Examining  columns  (6)  of Tables  6 
and 7 indicate  that including  private  sector  coverage  in the specification 
primarily  affects the coefficient  on public  sector  coverage  and does not in 
general  diminish  the importance  of the legal variables.  In most cases,  in 
fact,  the coefficients  on the legal variables  increase  in absolute  value. —21— 
The results  of the second  test do not reject  the null  hypothesis  of no 
significant  left—out-variables  bias.  The third test is to include the 
public  sector  bargaining  law variables  in a privste  sector  woge regression. 
The null hypothesis  would suggest  thst public  sector  bargaining  laws should 
have no effect on  private  sector  union wage differentials.  The alternative 
hypothesis  would  suggest  that they would  affect  these  differentials  in the 
same way as they  do in the public  sector.  The data indicate  that public 
sector  bargaining  laws do significantly  affect  private sector  wages,  but do 
not significantly  affect  private  sector  union wage differentials.  Specifi- 
cally,  private sector  wages  (private sector  union wage differentials)  are 
insignificantly  lower  (insignificantly  higher(  in states  which  prohibit 
collective  bargaining,  significantly  higher  (insignificantly  lower)  in 
states  which impose a Duty—to—Bargain,  and significantly  lower  (insignifi- 
cantly  lower) in states  which  provide  access  to arbitration.12  Again,  no 
evidence  supporting  the left—out—variable  hypothesis  is indicated  in the 
data. 
CONCLUS  ION 
The aim of this paper  has been  to examine  the role of  the  legal 
environment  in determining  the magnitude  of public  sector  union  wage 
differentials.  Specifically,  I  investigated  the hypothesis  that estimates 
of public  sector  union wage differentials  are lower  than estimates  of 
private  sector union  wage differentials  due to the weaker  legal rights 
afforded  to moat public  sector  unions at the bargaining  table.  Empirical 
estimates  of the effects  of the legal environment  were obtained  by taking 
advantage  of the wide variation  in  public sector  bargaining  laws across 
full set of private  sector  regression  results  is available  upon  request. -22— 
states.  The possibility  that  these  bargaining  laws are correlated  with  city 
or state—specific  left—out—variables  such as sentiment  toward unions  was 
addressed  in three  separate  fashions. 
The results  indicatcd  that there was  little difference  in public  sector 
union  wage differentials  when no bargaining  laws were controlled  for and 
when a Duty-to—Bargain  law was assumed.  This  indicates  that the legal 
envircnment  is not the  likely explanation  for the observed  disparity  in 
union wage differential  estimates  across  sectors.  However,  the data did 
indicate  that the  legal environment  was an important  determinant  uf public 
sector  union wage  differentials.  Generally,  the measured  differential 
increased  as the bargaining  rights of  the union were strengthened.  Finally, 
no significant  evidence  of left—out—variable  bias in the bargaining  law 
coefficients  was indicated  by the three tests  which were carried  out. —23— 
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TABLE  1  Frequency Distribution of Public Sector Barganing Laws  By Region 
Col  lect  ice 
Bargaining  "Weak"  Weak' 
Prohibi  ted  Bargaining  Duty-to-Bargain  Region 
'Strong' 
Duty-to—Bargain 
Aggregate  7.35  45.59  26.47  20.59 
Northeast  0.00  0.00  47.22  52.78 
Central  0.00  47.92  27.08  25.00 
South  20.58  60,30  19.12  0.00 
West  1.92  57.70  19.23 
TABLE 2  Frequency Distribution of Union Security By Region 
Region 
No  Public Sector  Public Sector 
Right-to—Work Law  Right-to—Work  Law 
Aggregate  68,75  31.25 
Northeast  100.00  0.00 
Central  58,33  41.67 
South  56.25  43.75 
Weat  72.73  27.27 
TABLE 3  Frequency Distribution of  Union Security By Bargaining Rights 
Colon 
Security 
CoS  lective 
Bargaining  Bargaining  "Weak"  "Strong" 
Prohibited  Rights  Duty-to-Bargain  Duty-to-Bargain 
Right-to-Work Law  11.67  58.33  18.33  11.67 
No Right-to—Work Law  6,06  35,61  31,82  26.52 —26— 
TABLE 4  Su..ary Statistics 
Teachers  Police 
CPS  COP  CPS  CoP 
Variable  Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Pooled  Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Pooled 
Sole College  0062  0374  0.368  0.382  0.419 
0.241)  (0.485)  0.484)  (0.488)  (0.493 
College Grad  0.480  0.574  0.416  0.294  0.102  0.083  0.127  0.119 
(0.499)  (0.495)  (0.493)  (0.456)  (0.304)  (0,277)  (0.335)  (0.324 
1st Yr Post  0.228  0.169  0.268  0.237  0.024 
Grad  (0.420)  (0.375)  (0.443)  (0.425)  (0.153 
2nd Yr Post  0.267  0.218  0.301  0.208  0.023 
Grad  (0.443)  (0.413)  (0.459)  (0.406)  (0.156 
3rd Yr Post  (0.092) 
Grad  (0.290) 
4th Yr  Post  (0.076) 
Grad  (0.265) 
Experience  13.693  12.948  14.203  15.388  16.335  17.222  15.173  16.303 
(10.702)  (10.934)  (10.518)  (10.712)  10.251)  (11.130)  (8.890)  (9.795 
Male  0.355  0.304  0.389  0.333  0.968  0.965  0.973  0.930 
(0.479)  (0.461)  (0.488)  (0.471)  (0.175)  (0.184)  (0.164)  (0.255 
White  0.917  0.908  0.924  0.765  0.917  0.930  0.900  0.834 
(0.276)  (0.290)  (0.265)  (0.424)  (0.276)  (0.255)  (0.301)  (0.372 
Married  0.707  0.705  0.708  0.629  0.819  0.840  0.791  0.758 
(0.455)  (0.456)  (0.455)  (0.483)  (0.386)  (0.368)  (0.409)  (0.428 
Northeast  0.205  0.133  0.254  0.236  0.104  0.409 
(0.404)  (0.340)  (0.436)  (0.426)  (0.306)  (0.494) 
South  0.290  0.439  0.188  0.268  0.382  0.118 
(0.454)  (0.497)  (0.391)  (0.444)  (0.488)  (0.324) 
West  0.217  0.181  0.242  0.252  0.250  0.254 
(0.413)  (0.385)  (0.429)  (0.435)  (0.434)  (0.438) 
Non SMSA  0.493  0.578  0.436  0.350  0.403  0.282 
(0.500)  (0.494)  (0.496)  (0.478)  (0.492)  (0.452) 
Private Sector  0.061  0.080 
Wage Residual  (0.109)  (0.103 TABLE  4:  Continued 
Teachers  Police 
CPS  CoP  CPS  COP 
Variable  Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Pooled  Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Poolen 
* Sch Districts  68.360 
(74 977) 
* Cities in SMSA  88.840 
(81  . 867 
Public  Unionist  0.394  0.499  0.433  0.635 
(0.491)  (0.267)  (0.496)  (0.260 
Priv  Unionis.  0.126  0.172 
(0.088)  (0.095 
Collective  Barg  0.019  0.106  0.032  0.017  0.055  0.090  0.009 
Prohibited  (0.136)  (0.308)  (0.175)  (0.098)  (0.229)  (0.288)  (0.081 
Duty-to—Barg  0.342  0.374  0.576  0.309  0.315  0.417  0.727  0,453 
(0.475)  (0.484)  (0.494)  (0.328)  (0.465)  (0.495)  (0.347)  (0.400 
Right-to—Arbit  0.035  0.046  0.059  0.011  0.106  0.111  0.245  0.302 
(0.184)  (0.210)  (0.236)  (0.079)  (0.309)  (0.315)  (0.432)  (0.408 
Right-to—strike  0 059  0.069  0.099 
(0.235)  (0.254)  (0.298) 
Right—to—Work  0.139  0.366  0.234  0.087  0.071  0.285  0.164  0.090 
(0.346)  (0.482)  (0.424)  (0.199)  (0.257)  0.453)  (0.372(  (0.230 
In Wage  1.761  1.645  1.840  5.710  1.810  1.740  5.837 
(0.361)  (0.357)  (0.342)  (0.567)  (0.342)  (0.361)  (0.292)  (0.451 
Note:  Table  list, variable  means  (standard deviations) for the variables used on the 
analysle.  Bargaining law variables in the pooled specifacations have been 
interacted with the public unionis, variable. —28- 
TABLE 5  Teacher Wage Regressions 
1977 CPS Data  1980 CoP Data 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
Variable  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  GLS  OLS 
Intercep  1420  1.325  1.693  4.375  4.367  4.369 
(0.070)  (0.105)  (0.099)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
So.e College  0.317  0.320  0.322 
(0.029)  (0.025)  (0.029) 
College Grad  0.046  0.116  -0.109  0.669  0.674  0.675 
(0.056)  (0.076)  (0.088)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
1st Yr Post  0.127  0.193  -0.028  0.824  0.828  0.828 
Grad  (0.057)  (0.081)  (0.089)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
2nd Yr Post  0.212  0.302  0.045  0.900  0.893  0.893 
Grad  (0.057)  (0.079)  (0.088)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
3rd Yr Post  0.918  0.920  0.921 
Grad  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
4th Yr Post  0.941  0.941  0.942 
Grad  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Experience  0.022  0.020  0.025  0.040  0.039  0.039 
(0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Experience Sq  —0.041  -0.039  —0.047  -0.067  —0.067  -0.067 
)X100)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Male  0.094  0.120  0.076  0.139  0.139  0 139 
(0.018)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
White  —0.057  —0.072  —0.024  0.040  0.044  0.044 
(0.032)  (0.051)  (0.040)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Married  0.016  0.053  —0.006  0.026  0.028  0.028 
(0.019)  (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Northeast  0.069  0.001  0.114 
(0.026)  (0.054)  (0.030) 
South  0.049  0.062  0.000 
(0.024)  (0.045)  (0.034) 
West  0.097  0.098  0.094 
(0.025)  (0.047)  (0.029) -29-- 
TABLE 5  Continued 
1977 CI'S Data  1980 CoP Data 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  ()  (6) 
Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
Variable  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  GLS  GLS 
Non SMSA  -0. 135  -0. 100  -0.  161 
(0018)  (0.030)  (0.022) 
Private Sector  0.385  0.404  0.360 
Wage  (0.044)  (0.070)  (0.070) 
*  Sch Districts  0.086  0.091  0.085 
(X100)  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Public ljnionis.  0 139  0  025  0.020  -0.113 
(0.025)  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.057) 
Prlv Unlonls.  0.519 
(0.166) 
Collective  Barg  -0.114  -0.005  —0.056  —0.026  -0.022  -0.031 
Prohibited  (0.066)  (0.053)  (0.065)  (0.044)  (0.059)  (0.058) 
Outy—to—Barg  0.064  0.021  0.045  0.071  0.059  0.055 
(0.026)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.029) 
Rlght-to—Arbit  -0.079  —0.047  —0.096  —0.035  —0.011  -0.014 
(0.049)  (0.073)  (0.047)  (0.052)  (0.070)  0.069) 
Right-to—Strike  -0.131  —0.050  —0.123 
(0.039)  (0.063)  (0.037) 
Right-to—Work  —0.125  0.019  -0 094  -0.015  -0 015  0.040 
(0.029)  (0.036)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.042)  (0 044) 
N  1,279  519  760  13,569  13,569  13,569 
R—Sq  0.327  0.215  0.346 
a  0.0888  0.1033  0.0781  0.2236  0.2205  0.2205 
5  0.0038  0.0034 
a 
Note:  Standard errors are  In parentheses.  Bargaining  law  variables in pooled regressions 
are interacted with the public unionis. variable. TABLE 6 
-30- 
Police Wage Regressions 
Var  table 
1977 CPS Data 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Pooled  NonUnion  Union 
OLS  OLS  OLS 
1980 CoP Data 
(4)  (5)  (6) 
Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
OLS  GLS  GLS 
1.439  1.385  1.622 
0.127)  (0.178)  (0.191) 
0.076  0.105  0.035 
(0.040)  (0.056)  (0.059) 
0.188  0.267  0.109 
(0.063)  (0.098)  (0.083) 
0.014  0.014  0.014 
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
—0.015  -0.014  —0.015 
(0.014)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
0.247  0.246  0.247 
(0.101)  (0.139)  (0.158) 
—0.053  -0.007  -0.124 
(0.066)  (0.098)  (0.094) 
0.008  —0.049  0.071 
(0.047)  (0.070)  (0,069) 
-0.004  —0.048  —0.073 
(0.058)  (0.103)  (0.082) 
—0.112  -0.146  -0.124 
(0.054)  (0.078)  (0.101) 
0.207  0 196  0.123 
(0.053)  (0.075)  (0.086) 
4.927  4.923  4.927 
(0036)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
0,070  0.063  0.063 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
0.138  0.137  0.136 
(0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
0.173  0.165  0,165 
(0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
0.262  0.245  0.246 
(0.040)  (0,040)  (0.040) 
0.035  0.034  0.034 
(0.102)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
—0.065  —0.062  —0.062 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
0.214  0.217  0.216 
(0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
0.089  0.092  0.092 
(0,017)  (0.016)  (0017) 
0.039  0.043  0.043 




1st  Yr Post 
Grad 
2nd Yr Post 
Grad 
Experience 








TABLE 6  Continued 
1977 CFS Data  1980 CoP Data 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Pooled  NonUnion  Union  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
Variable  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  GLS  IlLS 
Son  SMSA  -0.285  —0.283  —0.222 
(0.038)  (0.053)  (0.061) 
Private Sector  0.864  0.795  0.719 
Wage  (0.072)  (0.115)  (0  121) 
* Cities  ito  SMSA  0.042  0.045  0.043 
)X100(  (0.009)  (0.026)  (3.026) 
Public Unionlsi  0.118  0.128  0.133  —0.059 
(0.064)  (0.037)  (0.057)  (0.111) 
Private Unionist  0.687 
0.  327) 
Collective Barg  —0.096  -0,020  —0.216  —0.183  -0.210 
Prohibited  (0.083)  (0.097)  (0.082)  (0.112)  (0.112) 
Duty—to—Barg  0.006  0.155  0.042  0.089  0.078  0.123 
(0.071)  (0.063)  (0.073)  (0.030)  (0.053)  (0,057) 
Right—to—Arbit  —0,069  -0.090  —0.117  —0.022  —0.003  -0.049 
(0.069)  (0.095)  (0.070)  (0.026)  (0.049)'  (0.054) 
Right-to—Work  -0.083  -0.012  —0.133  -0.047  -0.062  0.008 
(0.079)  (0.063)  (0,080)  (0,032)  (0.058)  (0,067) 
N  254  144  110  4,353  4,353  4,353 
R—Sq  0.407  0.436  0.354 
a  0.0740  0.0820  0.0633  0,1605  0.1528  0.0529 
o  0.0100  0.0097 
a 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Bargaining  law variables in the pooled 
regressions are interacted with the public unionist variable. -32- 
TABLE 7: 
-  Comparisons of Public and Private Sector 
Union Wage Differentials 
Teachers  Police 
Legal Environment  CPS  CoP  CPS  CoP 
So  Legal Controls 
Pooled DLS  0.112  0.074  0.090  0.201 
(0.018)  (0.015)  (0,038)  (0.024) 
Separate OLS  0.130  0.071 




Pooled OLS  0.025  0.000  0.021  -0.089 
(0.065)  (0.046)  (0.105)  (0.083) 
Pooled OLS  —0.002  —0.050 
(0.065)  (0.114) 
Separate OLS  0.115  0.190 
(0.086)  (0.118) 
Meet and Confer 
Pooled OLS  0.139  0.025  0.118  0.128 
(0.025)  (0.021)  (0.064)  (0.038) 
Pooled OLS  0.020  0.133 
(0.038)  (0.057) 
Separate  OLS  0.172  0.170 
(0.038)  (0.082) 
Duty—to—Bargain 
So Strikes  or  Arbit 
Pooled OLS  0.203  0.096  0.124  0.217 
(0.024)  (0.016)  (0.054)  (0.033) 
Pooled OLS  0.079  0.210 
(0.030)  (0.056) 
Separate  OLS  0.180  0.057 
(0.038)  (0.070) —33- 
TABLE 7:  Continued 
Teachers  Police 
Legal Environment  CPS  CoP  CPS  CoP 
Duty-to-Bargain 
Access to Strikes 
or Arbitration 
Pooled OLS  0,123  0.061  0.054  0.195 
(0.049)  (0.054)  (0.065)  (0.025) 
Pooled  GLS  0.068  0.208 
(0.075)  (0.025) 
Separate OLS  0.140  0.030 
(0.093)  (0.100) 
Note:  Standard errors are  in parentheses 